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Going against the flow: the impact of PHARMAC not funding
COX-2 inhibitors for chronic arthritis
Rachel
Grocott, Scott Metcalfe
Clinical efficacy and safetyTwo large pivotal trials have been conducted to assess the
effectiveness of celecoxib and rofecoxib compared with conventional nonsteroidal
anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) in reducing gastrointestional (GI)
complications - the Celecoxib Long-term Arthritis Safety Study
(CLASS)1 and Vioxx Gastro-selective
Outcomes Research (VIGOR) study.2
These two trials found that COX-2 inhibitors are no more
effective than conventional NSAIDs in reducing pain and improving physical and
global functions in both OA and RA patients, but may be associated with a lower
rate of GI complications and improved tolerability. However, it has been widely
questioned whether the claims over GI safety were overstated, particularly as,
controversially, only the more positive 6-month CLASS results were reported even
though the 12-month results were
available.3–8
The cardiovascular safety of COX-2 inhibitors has also been
questioned since the VIGOR trail was published in
2000.3,9,10 This trial found a
five-fold incidence of myocardial infarction (MI) in patients administered
rofecoxib compared with the naproxen group (0.5% vs. 0.1%
respectively).11
These cardiovascular concerns were confirmed when rofecoxib
was abruptly withdrawn from the market in October 2004, following the results of
the Adenomatous Polyp Prevention on Vioxx (APPROVe) trial indicating an
increased risk of confirmed serious thrombotic events (including MI and stroke)
in long-term use.12†
A cumulative meta-analysis published in December 2004 based
on 18 RCTs reported a relative risk of MI with rofecoxib of 2.24 (95% CI
1.24-4.02). The authors concluded that rofecoxib should have been withdrawn
several years earlier.35
It was later estimated that rofecoxib could have caused
88,000–140,000 excess cases of serious coronary heart disease in the
United States, many of which were likely to have been
fatal.13 If COX-2 inhibitors were
funded in New Zealand, we estimate that this would have resulted in between 740
and 4220 additional MIs, with 330 to 1900 excess deaths from MI.‡
It seems likely that the increased cardiovascular risk is a
class effect of COX-2
inhibitors.14,15 The evidence on
COX-2 inhibitors, including their cardiovascular risk, was thoroughly reviewed
by the Medicines Adverse Reactions Committee (MARC) in early 2005. The Committee
concluded that there was an overall class effect for cardiovascular risk with
COX-2 inhibitors, and that given the limitations of the available data, all
COX-2 inhibitors should be treated comparably and any restrictions placed on the
products should be similar across the range of products (http://www.medsafe.govt.nz/profs/adverse/minutes121.htm).16
Background to PHARMAC’s DecisionPHARMAC first received an application to list celecoxib in
1999. An application for the listing of rofecoxib was received in 2000. As with
all applications PHARMAC receives, these applications were reviewed by
PHARMAC’s Pharmacology and Therapeutic Advisory Committee
(PTAC).§
PTAC considered that the place in therapy and safety profile
of COX-2 inhibitors still needed to be fully elucidated from post-marketing
experience. The committee considered that COX-2 inhibitors were expensive and
agreed that the additional expenditure over NSAIDs could not be justified
considering the modest decrease in serious GI complications. In addition, the
committee considered that patients at high risk of adverse events, including
gastro-intestinal ones, would still have to be considered at high risk if
treated with COX-2 inhibitors, hence targeting specific subgroups of patients
would be difficult. However, at the time, PTAC considered that there was no
clinical reason not to list these pharmaceuticals, hence PHARMAC staff continued
to evaluate these drugs.
A rapid economic analysis was undertaken in 2002 to assess
whether the benefits of COX-2 inhibitors (in terms of any reduction in GI
bleeds) would compensate for the substantially higher price, compared with other
pharmaceuticals PHARMAC has funded. This rapid analysis indicated that this
class of drugs was not cost-effective when compared with other pharmaceuticals
PHARMAC had funded. The analysis also indicated that given the available budget
they were unaffordable.
PHARMAC and PTAC continued to keep up-to-date with the
growing amount of international literature regarding the efficacy and safety
profile of COX-2 inhibitors and were aware of the increasing cardiovascular
concerns associated with COX-2 inhibitors.
In 2003 PHARMAC was asked to share its work on COX-2
inhibitors with District Health Board (DHB) hospitals. A summary discussion
document was written and distributed to DHB hospitals in April 2003 (http://www.pharmac.govt.nz/pdf/Cox2.pdf)
highlighting the clinical evidence, cardiovascular concerns, cost-effectiveness
and economic impact of COX-2
inhibitors.17
In September 2003 PHARMAC consulted with medical groups,
pharmaceutical suppliers and interested parties on a proposal not to fund COX-2
inhibitors. Following this consultation, the PHARMAC Board resolved to decline
the listing of celecoxib, rofecoxib and meloxicam on the Pharmaceutical
Schedule.
Government PolicyPHARMAC's objective, as outlined in the NZ Public Health and
Disability Act 2000, is to secure for eligible people in need of
pharmaceuticals, the best health outcomes that are reasonably achievable from
pharmaceutical treatment and from within the funding
provided.18
PHARMAC evaluated the evidence on COX-2 inhibitors,
including efficacy and cost-effectiveness. PHARMAC also calculated that funding
COX-2 inhibitors would exceed $30 million per year. Based on this evidence
PHARMAC concluded that for all patients that the cost of COX-2 inhibitors was
significant and the benefits relatively minimal when compared with other
pharmaceuticals awaiting funding.
PHARMAC must work within a fixed budget. Had COX-2
inhibitors been funded, then for the relevant time period this would have meant
not funding or extending access for at least 18 pharmaceutical treatments,
including extending access to statins and alendronate, venlafaxine, leflunamide,
newer antiepileptic agents, and 3/4ths of extending access to olanzapine.** We
calculate that by funding these pharmaceuticals rather than COX-2 inhibitors,
the equivalent of 437 ‘statistical lives’ were saved per
year†† (i.e. if COX-2 inhibitors had been funded then the equivalent
of 437 lives would have been lost per year from not receiving other
pharmaceutical treatments).‡‡
These investments also nominally saved an extra $17 million
to the health sector; funding COX-2 inhibitors would have meant not realising
these nominal savings.§§
Overall, the decision not to fund COX-2 inhibitors
ultimately resulted in greater health gains from the pharmaceutical budget than
would have been achieved otherwise. In fact, if COX-2 inhibitors were funded,
this would have achieved a small net health loss, due to excess
MIs.†††
Economic AnalysisIn early 2002 PHARMAC staff undertook a rapid economic
analysis for celecoxib using the 6-month CLASS data (indicative results
described above).19 A detailed
analysis on celecoxib and rofecoxib was then completed for PHARMAC in December
2003.
The results of the detailed analysis indicated that the cost
per quality adjusted life year (QALY) of COX-2 inhibitors (celecoxib and
rofecoxib) compared with conventional NSAIDs for patients with a high-risk of GI
haemorrhage‡‡‡ was over $1 million. For average risk patients,
there was no overall benefit and higher total costs (i.e. negative risk-benefit
ratio due to impact of MIs), with -0.00161 QALYs lost per patient per 5 years of
treatment. The cost/QALY of celecoxib alone compared with conventional NSAIDs in
high-risk patients was $450,000. This suggested that COX-2 inhibitors were not
cost-effective compared with other pharmaceuticals that could have been funded
at the time.20-24
§§§
These results are consistent with several other analyses
internationally.25-27
We acknowledge
that COX-2 inhibitors can provide benefits for the subgroup of patients who are
at high risk of GI bleeds and cannot tolerate or do not respond to conventional
NSAIDs. However, we consider that it is still not cost-effective to fund COX-2
inhibitors for this subgroup when compared with other pharmaceuticals that could
be funded – reflecting the trade-offs between improved GI symptoms and
sequelae versus cardiovascular adverse effects. As well, these patients are
still at risk of GI haemorrhage with COX-2 inhibitors, and as PTAC noted
previously, targeting would be difficult.
Current Situation: New ZealandThere are currently five COX-2 inhibitors available in New
Zealand – celecoxib (Celebrex), etoricoxib (Arcoxia), meloxicam (Mobic),
lumircoxib (Prexige), and parecoxib (Dynastat).****
The Medicine Adverse Reactions Committee (MARC) has examined
the evidence on the safety of COX-2 inhibitors, and recommended that they stay
on the market but with considerably stronger warnings and requirements by
pharmaceutical suppliers to collect and report information on their
usage.28 These recommendations have
been accepted by the Ministry of Health. This decision was based on the argument
that for some patients these medicines are the best treatment option. However
the stronger warnings reflect MARC’s view that an increased risk of heart
attacks and strokes can occur with all COX-2 inhibitors. This decision was
consistent with recommendations made by the European Medicines Evaluation
Agency, and the Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration.
COX-2 inhibitors are being used in New Zealand despite
PHARMAC not funding them. COX-2 inhibitors are funded by ACC (PHARMAC
understands this to be in the region of $1.1 million per year), whilst Pfizer
has been reported as estimating that 11,600 patients received celecoxib during
2004.16
Current Situation: InternationalAustraliaIn Australia celecoxib and rofecoxib were listed on the
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) in August 2000. The rapid uptake of
celecoxib and rofecoxib following their listing was unprecedented—800,000
prescriptions were written in the first 30 days, and 1.5 million prescriptions
were written by the end of the first four months. This had a significant effect
on the health budget, costing Aus$205 million in the 2000/01 financial
year.29 COX-2 inhibitors were
identified as a major reason for the health budget blowout in Australia in
2002.30,31
Following the withdrawal of rofecoxib, the Therapeutic Goods
Administration (TGA) undertook an urgent evaluation of COX-2
inhibitors.32 The results of this
review were considered by the Australian Drug Evaluation Committee (ADEC), which
made a number of recommendations to restrict the use of these drugs in
Australia, including the introduction of explicit warnings in product
information about the increased risk of cardiovascular adverse events. It also
recommended that COX-2 inhibitors be prescribed only when other treatments
cannot be tolerated or have caused serious adverse effects. In addition,
celecoxib and meloxicam should not be prescribed to patients with increased
risks of cardiovascular events and treatment should be limited to the shortest
time needed. The TGA is also advising patients to review their treatment and
dosage regime with their doctor.
Dispensings for COX-2 inhibitors in Australia during July
2005 (n=155,321) were 31% of their levels during the beginning of
2004.29
EuropeThe European Medicines Agency (EMEA) recommended the
suspension of the marketing authorisation for valdecoxib (Bextra) and new
contraindications and warnings for other COX-2
inhibitors:33,34
CommentPHARMAC will continue to review the evidence on new
pharmaceuticals, to try to ensure that maximum health gains can be obtained from
the budget available.
NZMJ
Note: This manuscript was commissioned by the New Zealand Medical Journal
for the PHARMAC Special Series.
Conflict
of interest: Scott Metcalfe is externally contracted to work with PHARMAC
for public health advice. Rachel Grocott declares no conflicts.
Author
information: Rachel Grocott, Senior Analyst, Hospital Pharmaceuticals
Assessment, PHARMAC, Wellington; Scott Metcalfe, Public Health Physician,
Wellington.
Correspondence:
Dr Scott Metcalfe, c/- PHARMAC, PO Box 10-254, Wellington. Fax: (04) 460 4995;
email: scott.metcalfe@pharmac.govt.nz
Endnotes:
*PHARMAC has not assessed
COX-2 inhibitors for use post-operatively.
†The APPROVe study was
a multi-centre, randomised, placebo-controlled, double-blind study to determine
the effect of 3 years treatment with rofecoxib on the recurrence of neoplastic
polyps of the large bowel in 2600 patients with a history of colorectal adenoma.
In this study 25 patients taking placebo versus 45 patients taking rofecoxib
experienced a confirmed serious thrombotic event. The absolute event rates were
approximately 3 per 400 patient years for placebo and 6 per 400 patient years
for rofecoxib, i.e. an absolute increase in risk of approximately 3 thrombotic
events per 400 patient years of treatment. The difference in event rates was
only apparent after 18 months of treatment.
‡This estimate is based
on uptake patterns in Australia. Between August 2000 (when celecoxib was funded
on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS)) and October 2004 (when rofecoxib
was withdrawn) there were 25,101,929 dispensings for celecoxib and rofecoxib in
Australia (PHARMAC analysis of PBS services and cost data at http://www.hic.gov.au/statistics/dyn_pbs/forms/pbs_tab1.shtml).
Had New Zealand funded COX-2 inhibitors at the same time, the total usage of
COX-2 inhibitors over the 51 month time period would have been 416,518
person-years. It is assumed that 50% of usage would be for rofecoxib and 50%
celecoxib. The estimate does not take into account the number of patients in New
Zealand who were taking COX-2 inhibitors at the time (either funded by ACC or
self-funded). The proportion of patients administered various NSAIDs was based
on script data between 2001-2002 financial year. Excess cases of MI were
calculated using methods similar to those of Graham et al [Lancet
2005;3365:475-81]. The relative risk of MI with rofecoxib (RR 2.24) is based on
the results of the Juni et al. meta-analysis on 18 RCTs on rofecoxib [Lancet
2004;364:2021-9], and the relative risk of MI with celecoxib (RR 1.4) was based
on the results of the Moore et al meta-analysis [Arthritis Res Ther
2005;7:R644-65]. The (weighted-average) risk of MI for patients administered
NSAIDs was calculated from the VIGOR and CLASS trials and the TennCare
observational study [(Ray et al. Lancet 2002;359:118-23]. The analysis assumes
case fatality rates for MI of 44-45% [sources: NZ 28-day case fatality rate
calculated from Auckland Regional Coronary Outcomes Study (ARCOS) data (Robert
Beaglehole and Alistair Stewart, personal communication 1996), registrants aged
35 to 64 years 1986 to 1992 (no. deaths with 28 days / no. registrants); United
Kingdom Heart Attack Study Collaborative Group (Norris RM. BMJ 199;316:1065-70;
American Heart Association statistics cited by Graham et al Lancet
2005].
§PTAC is a group of
clinicians that considers clinical evidence and provides independent and
objective advice to PHARMAC on the clinical consequences of funding decisions.
http://www.pharmac.govt.nz/ptac.asp
**This analysis calculates
that, based on Australian uptake rates, expenditure in the first year may have
been NZ$33.4 million (PHARMAC analysis of PBS data with 4,594,187 COX-2
inhibitor dispensings in the first 12 months in Australia; assumes
$1.20/patient/day cost). This compares with 18.7 pharmaceutical investments
between 1999/00 to 2003/04 giving the same estimated spending over the first 12
months. These investments, in order of total quality-adjusted life years (QALYs)
gained during the first 12 months that they were funded, were: statins;
alendronate and etidronate for severe osteoporosis; levonorgestrel-releasing
intrauterine devices and tranexamic acid for heavy menstrual bleeding; imatinib
for chronic myeloid leukemia + GIST; lamivudine for chronic Hepatitis B
infection; venlafaxine for refractory depression; 3/4ths of olanzapine for
schizophrenia; leflunomide for rheumatoid arthritis; naltrexone for alcohol
addiction; topiramate and gabapentin for refractory epilepsy; anastrazole for
advanced breast cancer; etanercept for juvenile rheumatoid arthritis; tacrolimus
for immunosuppression post any organ transplant; eformoterol (LABA) for asthma.
††In this
context, each ‘life saved’ is a statistical life, and each saved
life is equivalent to living a full quality of life for 36.4 remaining years
expected for the average New Zealand citizen. The present value is 9.7 years
after discounting at 10% (the discount rate used by PHARMAC for economic
analyses for decisions up until July 2005). ‘Statistical lives’ are
calculated from total quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) estimated for
decisions, by dividing total QALYs by the above 9.7 discounted years lost
prematurely per average death. Further information about QALYs is available at
http://www.nzma.org.nz/journal/116-1170/362/
and http://www.pharmac.govt.nz/pdf/QALYExplanation.pdf
‡‡In this
analysis approximately 4,231 QALYs would have been lost in the first 12 months
alone had PHARMAC not funded the 18.7 new investments but had instead funded
COX-2 inhibitors. This equates to 906 QALYs per million population per year.
This estimate does not take into account patients in New Zealand who were taking
COX-2 inhibitors at the time (either funded by ACC or self-funded).
§§According to
PHARMAC’s economic analyses for the 18.7 investments, spending the $33.4
million over the first 12 months would mean fewer health sector costs elsewhere
through reduced use of other pharmaceuticals, hospitalisations, disability
support services, etc., to the tune of $17.0 million (i.e. offsets of 51%).
Hence the net cost to DHBs of these 18.7 investments was $16.4 million over the
first 12 months. By contrast, funding COX-2 inhibitors would have meant savings
to the health sector of $9.3 million through reduced costs of conventional
NSAIDs. Hence, the net savings to DHBs through the 18.7 investments rather than
COX-2 inhibitors would have been $7.6 million over the first 12 months (the
difference between the $17.0 million and $9.3 million, with rounding). This
estimate does not take into account patients in New Zealand who were taking
COX-2 inhibitors at the time (either funded by ACC or self-funded).
†††On
average perhaps 454 (range 136-772) additional MIs and 204 (60-347) excess
deaths from MI during would have occurred in New Zealand during the first year
of COX-2 inhibitor funding – using the same methods as earlier in endnote
‡ (based on Graham et al Lancet 2005) and an estimated 76,232 patients
predicted to use COX-2 inhibitors in New Zealand within the first 12 months
(PHARMAC analysis of PBS services data). Taking into account the number of major
GI bleeds prevented from the use of COX-2 inhibitors (approximately 225 –
based on the incidence rates in CLASS and VIGOR) this results in an overall
risk-benefit ratio of COX-2 inhibitors 2.6:1. However, due to a lower
case-fatality rate with major GI bleeds (approximately 12% - see Economic
analysis section) compared with MIs (44-45%), the risk-benefit ratio of COX-2
inhibitors in preventing death is 9.9:1 (i.e. patients administered COX-2
inhibitors are approximately 10-times more likely to die from MI compared with a
major GI bleed). Hence any QALY gains from fewer GI bleeds would be offset by
greater QALY losses from excess MIs. This estimate does not take into account
patients in New Zealand who were taking COX-2 inhibitors at the time (either
funded by ACC or self-funded).
‡‡‡Patients
with a high risk of GI haemorrhage were defined for the purposes of the economic
analysis here as persons with a history of GI ulcer events.
§§§Cost/QALYs
of other pharmaceuticals that could have been funded at the time (1999/00 to
2003/04) included: Extending access to erythropoetin beta for anaemia of chronic
renal failure (2002/2003) $-40,000/QALY; Access for olanzapine for schizophrenia
- existing patients with risperidone failure (1999/2000) $-5,748/QALY; Extending
access to alendronate for osteoporosis (2003/2004) $-3,395/QALY; Listing of
levonorgestrel-releasing IUS for heavy menstrual bleeding (2002/2003) $750/QALY;
Listing of lamivudine for chronic Hepatitis B infection (1999/2000) $1,500/QALY;
Extending access to tranexamic acid for heavy menstrual bleeding (2001/2002)
$2,185/QALY; Extending access to statins for cardiovascular risk (dyslipidaemia)
(2001/2002) $2,495/QALY; Listing of alendronate for severe osteoporosis
(1999/2000) $3,545/QALY; Listing of naltrexone for alcohol addiction (2003/2004)
$3,600/QALY; Extending access to anastrazole for breast cancer (advanced )
(2002/2003) $4,000/QALY; Listing of venlafaxine for refractory depression
(2003/2004) $4,000/QALY; Extending access to etidronate for osteoporosis
(2003/2004) $6,492/QALY; Extending access to alendronate for osteoporosis to 1+#
(BMD<-3.0) (2000/2001) $12,426/QALY; Extending access to tacrolimus for
immunosuppression post any organ transplant (primary treatment or rescue
therapy) (2003/2004) $12,500/QALY; Listing of leflunomide for rheumatoid
arthritis (2001/2002) $14,086/QALY; Listing of gabapentin for refractory
epilepsy (2000/2001) $15,000/QALY; Listing of topiramate for epilepsy
(refractory) (2000/2001) $18,500/QALY; Listing of imatinib for chronic myeloid
leukemia + GIST (2002/2003) $18,900/QALY; Extending olanzapine for schizophrenia
to new cases (1999/2000) $27,467/QALY; Listing of eformoterol for asthma symptom
control (2000/2001) $40,000/QALY; Listing of etanercept for juvenile rheumatoid
arthritis (2003/2004) $40,000/QALY.
****Valdecoxib (Bextra) was
voluntarily withdrawn in April 2005 due to concerns about an increased risk of
serious skin reactions.
References:
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